The Political Importance of the Englis/ Bishops During the Reign of Edward II ' NDIGNOS quoque et ineptos ad gradus ecclesiasticos rex J promovit, quod postmodum sudes in oculis et lancea in latere sibi fuit.' Thus Higden described the part played by the leading English ecclesiastics in Edward II's reign, and most contemporary chroniclers apparently agreed with him. They readily elaborated denunciations of the bishops' insufficiency in colourful and emphatic language, attributing all the evils of the time to their influence. 2 These denunciations have been repeated in historical work down to the present day. Stubbs' verdict that ' the misgovernment of the reign was generally attributed to the prelates, some of whom were distinctly evil men, and the great majority weak ones ',3 has been followed without much modification by Capes,4 Tout,5 and Mr. Conway Davies. 6 The troubles of the reign undoubtedly gave to the episcopate an opportunity for political leadership not offered to it since the minority of Henry III. The object of this paper is to see how the bishops used this opportunity and to investigate the truth of the chroniclers' opinions of their activities.
Bishops were bound by three chief loyalties: to the king, 1 Higden, Polychronicon (R.S.), viii. 298-300. 2 See, e.g., Malmesbury, 'Vita Edwardi II ', ibid. pp. 251-4; Flores Historiarum (R.S.), iii. 155-6; Blaneforde (R.S.), p. 142. A few chroniclers praised individual bishops, but usually only when they agreed with their political views. Thus the author of the relevant section of the Flores Historiarum, a rabid Lancastrian, consistently praised bishops who supported the Lancastrian party and denounced the royalists (e.g. iii. 144, 154-6, 169, 170-1, 177).
3 Chronicles Edw. I and II, i. p. cxvi. 4 See his English Church in the 14th and 15th Centuries (London, 1900), pp. 49-53, 57-60, 63-4. 5 In his Place of Edward II (1937), pp. 19, 21, Tout questioned the teaching of Stubbs that both barons and bishops of the early fourteenth century were cast in a meaner mould than the heroes of the thirteenth century, but agreed with him that the younger generation of political bishops in Edward II's reign had scarcely been too severely castigated. 6 Conway Davies (Baronial Opposition to Edw. II) tends to minimize the political importance of the bishops without disputing the chroniclers' statements that they were constantly engaged in political intrigues. He practically omits the bishops from his discussion of the personal aspects of the reign (pp. 75-115), and maintains (pp. 18-22) that the earls always took the lead in political movements.
to the pope, and (in varying degrees) to the barons, particularly those who were their neighbours. Their reaction to the interplay of these frequently conflicting loyalties was determined largely by their individual personalities, but also by their very varied social background and early careers.' Only a few, about a fifth of the episcopate, were connected with powerful baronia families, but naturally some of these eight or nine bishops, such as Louis de Beaumont, Henry Burghersh, or David Martin, adopted the political attitude of their kinsmen. More importan was the fact that about half the bishops ruled dioceses in or nea which they had been born, while ten more had previous connexions in their dioceses through landholding kinsmen or as members o the cathedral chapters. These local or regional influences often played a considerable part in shaping their political outlook. The large and important group of at least sixteen king's clerks on the other hand, many of them new men who had risen through lon years of service in the royal administration, might be expected to have entered on their episcopal careers with a strong political bias in favour of the court party. Many of them continued to b employed in the king's service after their appointments as bishops.
It is, however, interesting to notice a definite change in the number and kind of royal clerks promoted to the episcopate in the last half of the reign. At the beginning of the reign the episcopate included a fairly large proportion of theologians without previous experience in the royal administration, while those king's clerks who obtained bishoprics were often men without university degrees who had been trained in the wardrobe, or, less often, i the chancery or exchequer. But after the accession of John XX in 1316, and the greatly increased use of papal provisions as th normal method of appointing to bishoprics, king's clerks came to form considerably more than half the episcopate. These men, unlike the wardrobe clerks, were often distinguished scholars with high qualifications in canon and civil law; while their experienc in the royal service had been chiefly in diplomatic work, whic gave them a rather different outlook from that of the household clerk. Apparently they mostly owed their bishoprics to John XXII, himself a lawyer, who had known certain of them a Avignon, rather than to the king, who was often angrily opposed to their appointments.2 Therefore, though they might normall have greater sympathy with the political outlook of the cour party than with that of the opposition barons, they wer 1 I have collected detailed evidence for the conclusions given below on the social background and early careers of the bishops, and hope to publish some of it soon.
2 E.g. this was the case in the appointments of Adam of Orleton, John Stratford and William Airmyn, who intrigued at Avignon for their bishoprics in opposition t the king's wishes.
unlikely to be personally loyal to Edward; and their a chief factor in the triumph of Isabella. Certain recruited chiefly perhaps from monks,' theologians, secular clergy, withdrew as much as possible from concentrated their energies on ruling their dioce these groups of men included leading statesmen, su bishop Winchelsea himself, or John Salmon, the bishop of Norwich. Monasteries were certainly not c political influences; 2 while certain secular cathedr were undoubtedly often influenced in their politica the local aristocratic outlook. Moreover, at the universities certain scholar bishops had made varying political contacts; for instance, pupils of Archbishop Winchelsea at Oxford co-operated with him later in politics as bishops. 3 Dom David Knowles has recently suggested that the accession of Winchelsea to the see of Canterbury in 1294 marked the beginning of a new epoch in English church history. For nearly a century the archbishops had been nominated from Rome and had identified themselves with the great movement of centralization and reform which the thirteenth-century popes were directing, but Winchelsea, like his successors in the fourteenth century, had his centre of gravity firmly fixed in England. Henceforward, with the exception of Bradwardine, no English theologian of European fame was appointed to the see of Canterbury.4 Possibly the much greater interest which Winchelsea took in English affairs than his predecessors, the two friars Kilwardby and Pecham, may be partly responsible for the increased political activity of the episcopate as a whole under his rule. But in other ways Winchelsea, a great theologian and a famous preacher,5 had more in common with the thirteenth-century archbishops of Canterbury than with his successor Walter Reynolds. He was a strong-willed, independentminded man, uncompromisingly asserting what he thought to be his rights against all rival powers. In politics he combined high clerical claims with strong sympathies for the baronial opposition 1 Nine bishops in the episcopate of forty-five were regular clergy. This is a surprisingly large number in comparison with the eight monks among the seventy-eight bishops of Henry III's reign (cf. M. Gibbs and J. Lang, Bishops and Reform, 1215--72, Oxford, 1934, pp. 3, 5-10).
to the king. He felt himself to be treading in the footsteps of St. Thomas Becket,1 and was honoured as a saint by contemporaries.2 Walter Reynolds, on the other hand, had spent his early life as a clerk in the royal service, where from 1301-7 he had been keeper of Edward's wardrobe while Edward was prince of Wales.3 In character he seems to have been very easy-going and lacked power of decision. He owed both his bishopric of Worcester and his archbishopric to Edward II, and his chief political object was apparently to work in peaceful co-operation with the ruling power in the state, whoever that might be.
Winchelsea had force of character and power of political leadership;
Reynolds was almost completely lacking in both.
Winchelsea's pontificate thus seems to form a link between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in episcopal history. Certainly, for the episcopate the main dividing line in the political history of Edward II's reign comes in the spring of 1313, when Winchelsea's death removed from the political stage the only really dominating personality among the bishops. Up till then the political issues had appeared simpler, more clear-cut, and more in line with those of the thirteenth-century struggles than they were under Reynolds.
After 1313 the episcopate was for some time virtually without a leader. But towards the end of the reign, as politics became more complicated and more involved with dynastic issues, and when there was an increase of opportunism and political self-seeking generally in the country, the extremists among the bishops seized the political initiative, leaving the worried and anxious archbishop to accept the accomplished fact of their triumph. It was not until the April parliament held at Westminster shortly after Winchelsea's return to England on his own terms that the opposition insisted on Gavastorn's exile; and the archbishop then pronounced sentence of excommunication on him should he return to England, and on all who might favour or help him. 4 The importance of this sentence is shown by the fact that Edward did not dare to recall Gavaston until he had persuaded the pope himself to revoke it, and even then Gavaston did not return until the papal bull of revocation had been definitely received and accepted by the archbishop. Thus the king broke up the alliance between the various elements in the opposition and defeated its plans largely through inducing the pope to control the determined archbishop of Canterbury.5 This is a striking illustration not only of the political power of the Church, but also of the difficulties of Winchelsea's political position. With regard to his relations with the pope an undated letter from the archbishop to Clement V, written probably towards the end of 1 be present also at the parliament. The king angrily ordered him to postpone the consecration; 4 and a definite political breach in the ranks of the episcopate was plainly shown up by the following events. John Droxford, who had long been a trusted civil servant, and who owed his appointment as bishop to the king, preferred to forgo his own consecration rather than to be absent from th parliament at which the magnates ratified Gavaston's recall.5 Bishop Woodlock, too, informed the archbishop that his parliamentary duties at Stamford would prevent him from assisting at the consecration; 6 while the charter dated at Stamford, which confirmed the exchange of Gavaston's lands was witnessed by four other bishops, Anthony Bek, John Langton, Ralph Baldock and Walter Reynolds. There they agreed to promise nothing to the pre Moreover, Tout has pointed out that the experience in office o the two ex-ministerial bishop ordainers would have shown the where the root of the trouble lay, and suggested that they ma have been partly responsible for the purging of the household Naturally, in the publication of the ordinances the Church too the lead.6 Sentences of excommunication against all who shou infringe them were proclaimed by the archbishop and bishops; and, as with the Confirmatio Cartarum of 1297, Winchelsea ha copies of the ordinances sent to every diocese of his province and ordered them to be read annually.8 In the meantime certa bishops of the southern province had apparently been adopting an attitude of unhelpfulness similar to that of some earls toward the king's efforts to defend the north. In July 1310 Simon o Winchelsea's reaction to Gavaston's third return from exile and to the king's further disregard of the ordinances had mea while been more vigorous and had much greater authority tha his protests against the favourite's second return. He was no longer hampered by papal opposition: hence his general senten of excommunication against all infringers of the ordinances ca into force against Gavaston as soon as he reached England; an the archbishop then held a meeting of Canterbury convocati where the bishops' obligations to uphold the ordinances we debated under eight headings.8 It was decided that the bisho were bound by oath to observe the ordinances and to force others to observe them; that they should pronounce excommunicate who had worked against the ordinances; that those notorious sinning in this respect should be notoriously punished; and th the earls and barons who had sworn to uphold the ordinances should be advised that they were bound to do so. For the present, however, it was considered inexpedient for the bishops to write to the pope and cardinals in favour of the ordinances.' Having thus again united the majority of the bishops under his leadership with a definite political programme, Winchelsea proceeded to summon a joint meeting of the bishops and magnates to St.
Paul's on 13 March 1312.2 Here he made his public denunciation of Gavaston,3 and it was probably at this council that the measures for defence against the king and Gavaston were drawn up, certain earls and barons being directed to guard different parts of the country. 4 The archbishop, indeed, seems now to have been acting in a sense as party leader. He was said to have won over the earl of Warenne ' qui diu ante titubans, parti regis favebat, per Archiepiscopum Cantuariensem paribus suis, ad praedicta negotia prosequenda reconciliatur '.6 Moreover, for the first time in the reign his policy of opposition received some support from at least one of the northern bishops. Richard Kellaw, bishop of
Durham, was at this time in serious trouble with the king, ' because the bishop did not firmly stand by the king in favouring Peter of
Gavaston against the community of the kingdom, as the king wished . . . the bishop was moved to do otherwise by conscience and because to him it was a serious thing to oppose the community .6 Kellaw's action may well be an indication that the north was becoming disillusioned about Edward's ability to defend it against the Scots, and was beginning to think that
Lancaster might be able to do more for it.7 Once more then Winchelsea had been successful in building up a party of opposition to the king, but he could not hold it together against the royalist reaction which followed the capture and execution of Gavaston. Trokelowe, the contemporary chronicler at St. Albans, where many of the scenes which he described took place, attributed much of the credit for the successful mediation between the king and the extremists among the earls to the English bishops and the earl of Gloucester.8 He said that when the papal legates came to St. Albans to treat for peace they were repulsed by the barons who told them they had enough Archbishop Reynolds succeeded a great man to whose political views he had been opposed, and his suffragans were probably prejudiced against him on account of the suspicions of simony and intrigue connected with his appointment.1 He was unsuited by character and temperament to be a political leader. Moreover, although his letters show that he was genuinely anxious to promote the peace and prosperity of the country,2 he also set much store by a quiet life for himself, particularly towards the end of his pontificate, and was unwilling to take any strong line of action which might bring him into conflict with the king. Therefore he made little effort to lead the episcopate, or to provide it, as Winchelsea had done, with a political policy which emphasized the bishops' duties to the Church equally with their duties to the State. For the future each bishop was generally left to decide for himself in which direction his political duty or interest lay; and it was perhaps natural that towards the end of the reign, as the political situation became more confused, the bishops' attitudes were swayed far more by regional and personal influences than they had been under Winchelsea. There was less consistency and continuity in their actions, and different groups of bishops appeared as leaders in different crises.
At the same time the increasing number of king's clerks in the episcopate were more important in administrative and political work, a development certainly helped by the fact that the archbishop of Canterbury was no longer trying to force the episcopate as a body to adopt a policy of opposition to the Crown; but, as Tout has shown, also largely the result of the way in which administration was coming for the first time to be mixed up with the general political conflict.3 In particular, the attempts of the barons to control ministerial appointments caused the key officers, such as the chancellor and treasurer, who were generally bishops, to adopt a much more definite political attitude than had been usual formerly. Further, the changing character of the council was giving greater opportunities for administrative and political work to both barons and bishops not holding office, but willing to co-operate in the work of government. Recent work on the council emphasizes the importance of Edward II's reign as the time when there definitely came to be a magnate element in the During the first critical years about 1314-16 Reynolds took a leading share in the work of collaboration and was more active politically than at any other time in his pontificate. He seems indeed to have directed the main work of government, deriving his authority, like the earl of Pembroke in the years 1312-14, from his dominant position on the council and as keeper of the realm in the king's absence.2 A striking illustration of the way the administration had come to depend on him is one of his letters rebuking John Sandall, lieutenant of the treasurer, and other officers for saying they dared do nothing without him.3 At the same time at least six other bishops were also using their administrative or political experience in the king's service, either by acting on the council, by opening parliaments or by holding other royal commissions. These were John Droxford, John Langton, Walter Stapleton, Walter Maidstone, the new bishop of Worcester, and Walter Langton, all of whom had formerly been After Bannockburn there was naturally a reaction against Edward, especially in the north, which suffered most from the defeat, and here the bishops plainly helped to voice the general discontent. In the early months of 1315 William Greenfield, archbishop of York, held two pseudo or counter-parliaments of barons, knights, and clergy, independently of the king, at York and Doncaster to decide on measures for defence.5 The second writ of summons, sent out for the Doncaster meeting on the urgent request of Lancaster and other magnates, definitely stated that the plan was the result of an accord between the archbishop and Lancaster.6 In the south the clergy received little help or sympathy from Archbishop Reynolds in their protests against the form of the writs by which they were summoned to parliaments 7 or in their complaints that the liberties of the Church were being infringed by the king and his ministers. They did, however, find a defender of their privileges in Walter Stapleton, bishop of Exeter, who, though he often gave valuable support to the king, was a man of independence and courage who refused to be bound to any political party. He apparently had some support from Meanwhile a number of men from all political groups were beginning to work together to save the country from the anarchy into which Lancaster's inability to govern was plunging it. Bishops took a leading share from at least 1315 onwards in building up the alliance known as the 'middle party '; while during the perio of its ascendancy from 1318-20 about seventeen 4 out of twenty three bishops took an active part in its work. The treaty of Leake shows the paramountcy of the bishop
position. Eight bishops, four earls, four barons and one o
Lancaster's bannerets were nominated to guide the king; and o these, two bishops, one earl, one baron and Lancaster's bannere were to be constantly with him. Thus for the only time in th reign in a committee of the three orders the number of bishop was equal to that of the earls and barons together. At the October parliament at York the symmetry of this rather academic agreement on the distribution of powers broke down, probabl under pressure of the claims of individuals, and two more bishops and seven barons were added to the council.6 Even so, bishops still formed two-fifths of the whole council, and their exceptionall large representation does seem to reflect the leading part they to the archbishopric of York in 1317 and having great influenc in that region, are signs that the north was now co-operating in the work of the middle party. Melton's activity is also of interest as that of a former royal clerk ready to use his administrative experience in the cause of reform. In this he was typical of a large number of royal clerks among the bishops now actively supporting the middle party. In all at least ten bishops with experience in the royal service were present at the parliament. Much of the administrative reform achieved was possibly due to their help and expert knowledge.
During 1319 and 1320 the alliance held together and bishops continued to work with the lay members of the group to make these years the most prosperous of the reign. In November 1318
Bishop Salmon prepared ' to assist the king until the beginning of 5 At first Edward does not seem to have treated Orleton's share in the rising so seriously as that of Droxford and Burghersh, e.g. on 6 February 1322 he ordered Bishop's Castle to be restored to him (C.P.R. 1321-4, p. 53). The attack against him was revived about the time when Orleton was said to be contriving Mortimer's escape from the Tower. Possibly therefore the political situation in 1324 rather than the bishop's actions in 1320-22 caused Edward's exceptional anger against him.
6 The presentation of the jury on Orleton's help to the rebels is printed from Assize Roll 1388, m. In the north, where there was a strong tradition of loyalty to the Crown, dating back to the battle of the Standard in the twelfth century, the attitude of the bishops was again similar to that of the barons of the region; and here Archbishop Melton, himself a Yorkshireman, whose natural feeling of loyalty had been strengthened by many years' service in Edward's household, both as prince and king, seems to stand out as leader of both northern barons and bishops. Possibly it was the weight of
Melton's authority in the north, which made Lancaster especially anxious to secure the presence of the northern prelates at his counter parliament at Sherburn-in-Elmet on 28 June 1321.3 If at this time the north could be induced to give its whole-hearted support to the plan for an alliance with Lancaster and the lords of the Welsh march against the Despensers, the king could hardly avoid defeat; and so the reply of the bishops and clergy to
Lancaster's Sherburn articles was eagerly awaited. In effect this reply4 expressed simply and with great clarity the political attitude of the north. Obviously the clergy were not vitally interested in the grievances elaborated in the articles, nor indeed in the general political situation in England. Throughout the reign the main object of the north was to secure some defence against the Scots, and the chief reason for the attendance of all three northern bishops at Sherburn seems to have been merely that for the present Lancaster was better able than the king to defend them. The condition of their co-operation was that
Lancaster should help them against the Scots, and for this purpose the clergy were willing to grant him a subsidy.5 But they were not prepared to oppose the king, and stated definitely that parliament was the place in which to seek a remedy for Lancaster's grievances. None of the three bishops sealed the Sherburn In the south the attitude of the more moderate men am the bishops, who were given no effective lead by their m politan, was generally confused and indecisive. At times t attempted to mediate between king and barons,7 but their acti ties had little interest or importance until in Decemoer 1 Edward decided to use Canterbury Convocation as an instru for reversing the judgement of the August parliament on Despensers.8 His action in ordering Archbishop Reynol summon this convocation suggests that he thought the clergy more likely to support him than parliament. But thoug secured from them the formal decision which he sought,9 a num of bishops were apparently unwilling to give it their approval, at least thought that parliament and not convocation was the place where such a decision should be made. Only five bishops out of a possible seventeen were present,10 which certainly detracted from the authority and political value of the Edward thought it necessary to send urgent wr bishops ordering them to deliberate on the judge advisers and to send him their opinion.1 Of th found to these writs,2 those of Bishop Cobham and Bishop Stapleton are especially noteworthy. Both urged the king that if he were determined on revoking the sentence against the Despensers, the appropriate place for it to be done was in a parliament summoned for the purpose.3 Stapleton put the case more strongly than Cobham,4 and Edward was especially angry with him. He marvelled that the bishop, who, he thought, of all prelates was especially bound to wish a good issue to this business, should have sent him such a churlish reply, and ordered him to send a different answer and to come to him in person immediately.5
Stapleton boldly restated his previous advice,6 and ultimately Edward was wise enough to accept it. Public revocation of the sentence was made in the York parliament of May 1322, where Stapleton again took up the office of treasurer which he had resigned on 25 August 1321 after the exile of the Despensers.7 Apparently, therefore, the chief motive for his outspoken advice to the king had not been any political objection to the return of the Despensers, but rather the wish to make their position more secure by obtaining for it the legal authority of parliament. As in 1315 and 1316, when he is thought to have championed the cause of the clergy in convocation and parliament against the king, he seems to have been genuinely anxious that constitutional forms should be observed. His letters show independent judgement and outspoken frankness at a time when few men were willing to risk their careers for principles of this kind.
The controlling part played by four or five bishops in the last years of the reign, both in directing the revival of opposition to the Crown and the Despensers, and in the final act of the deposition, is well known, and has coloured the views of historians as to the character of the bishops' activities throughout the reign.
Certainly these few bishops acted discreditably in a spirit of political self-seeking. It may, however, be of interest to discuss a few points on which some modifications or additions to the usual view of their activities may be suggested.
In the first place, the way in which bishops who had formerly 1 Foedera, in, i. 470. 2 The third reply found was from Bishop Droxford, who stated simply that he approved of Convocation's answer, and wished to agree with the conclusion of the king and his best men (Cal. Reg. Drokensford, Other royal clerks among the bishops who, for v were in disgrace with the king or found it difficu him, had much less hesitation than Reynolds in
In this connexion it is interesting to see how for s had apparently been using her influence, probably but certainly in association with bishops who lat against him, and seems to have been trying to b favourable to herself in the episcopate. She was the bishops in forcing the king to come to terms w barons both in 1312-13 after Gavaston's murder, 1 See, e.g., his letter of 21 October 1326 describing his horror at and his refusal to return to London until peace was establish i. 272-3). He conducted a long and anxious correspondence measures to be taken in the event of an invasion (Lit. Cant. i. 127 194-6). Orleton's share in the politics of these last yea almost entirely to his devotion to Mortimer as feudal lord.4 The bishop's character, with its combination of ability, subtlety, and boldness in seizing opportunities, seems to have been more complex than this suggests; and in any case it is difficult to see that the guiding principle of his political intrigues was ever anything higher than his own personal advantage.5
Moreover, Canon Bannister possibly tends to underestimate the influence on Adam's later political attitude of the years which he had spent in the royal service before he became a bishop.6 They probably developed his liking for and ability in political intrigue, but they may also have helped to give him that markedly royalist outlook on politics, which, so long as it did not conflict with his own interests, was apparent in his activities under Edward III.7 Naturally, after 1321 it was impossible for him to work with Edward II, and, like other discontented royal clerks, he seems to have found a congenial outlet for his political experience and energies in helping to build up the rival court group, which finally split the king's party, and which, working with members of nearly every other political group, was directly responsible for Edward's downfall. 3 Baker (pp. 16-23), who disliked both these bishops intensely, gives a vivid account of the way in which they helped to revive the hostility of the magnates to the king. 4 Canon Bannister has tried to explain the bishop as one of the few consistent politicians of the reign, who throughout his career was faithful to his two loyalties to Mortimer and Pope John XXII (Introduction to Reg. Orleton, pp. xii-xiii, li).
5 E.g. in the reign of Edward III Orleton was quite unscrupulous in putting his own interests before those of Mortimer. In 1327 he deserted the new government to go on a mission to Avignon, where he secured another bishopric in opposition to the wishes of Mortimer and Isabella (cf. Chapters, iii. 16); and the fall of Mortimer in 1330 did not cause him to lose the king's favour.
6 His long diplomatic career has been worked out in detail from entries in Foedera and in the calendars of Patent and Close Rolls by Canon Bannister, loc. cit. pp. iiixlvi. Between 1307 and 1317 he spent much of his time as king's proctor at the papal court, travelling back to England once or twice every year. 7 See, e.g., Chapters, iii. Investigation of the bishops' connexions with dif groups has shown that the so-called ' parties ' of th existed, or at least were much more varied and f has usually been supposed. Few bishops had p nexions with any one group, and it is impossible into supporters of the different baronial opposition middle party, the king's party, or the queen's party connexions of most men in the reign are puzzlin and generally there is little evidence by which they tangled. The most that can be done is to indicat which bishops seem to have inclined to this or t so, in one and the same crisis they might have c several different groups, while their actions in show that the outlook of many bishops changed wi political conditions.1
On a few points, however, some modification of may be suggested. First, a much higher propor apparently supported the king than has hithert
Bishops had a special relationship to the king advisers, which was emphasized in the religio the coronation; and there was also a strong tradition that Church and king should co-operate in the maintenance of law and order.2 It was in the bishops' interests as well as in the king's to preserve peace, and in their letters they constantly lamented the general unrest and disturbances, and ordered prayers for peace to be said throughout their dioceses.3 Even Winchelsea was unable to force a number of his suffragans to adopt his policy of opposition to Edward. Under Reynolds many former royal clerks in the episcopate did valuable administrative and political work in co-operation with the government; and in the last years of the reign, when the court party was divided, five bishops remained loyal to Edward. It therefore seems that Tout went too far in maintaining that the normal political attitude of the spiritual aristocracy was absolutely the same as that of the lay magnates.4 Naturally some bishops, at times a fairly large number, including men who had been clerical civil servants, did co-operate politically with the lay barons. The chief influence in determining their attitude, however, seems to have been not so much the general fact of their promotion to baronial status, which Tout emphasized, as the regional influence with which they came in contact through the geographical position of their bishoprics. So long as Winchelsea remained to hold the opposition together these influences were kept in check, and at times the episcopate had a definitely ecclesiastical outlook on politics. Then in the middle years of the reign the bishops were chiefly 6ccupied in trying to keep the peace and in working with the government. But in the falling apart of the alliance of baronial groups after 1320, bishops living in those regions where the barons usually presented a united front on political issues acted more and more with them, especially when, as so often happened in this reign, the bishops had local connexions in their dioceses before their promotion to the episcopate. Some of the most interesting examples of such influence on the bishops are seen in that of the Welsh marcher lords on the bishops of Wales and the Welsh march. The attitude of the north, too, with its tradition of loyalty to the Crown, and its preoccupation with the Scottish danger, was a chief factor in shaping the political outlook of most northern bishops. There were, of course, exceptions, particularly among bishops living in the sphere of Lancastrian influence in the midlands and north midlands. The career of Walter Langton, born in Leicestershire, and holding the see of Coventry and Lichfield midway between the Lancastrian and Welsh border lands, is a striking example of how long training in the royal service and a strong feeling of loyalty to the Crown could outweigh all regional influence on a bishop's political attitude. Nevertheless, the way in which regional influences so often shaped the bishops' political actions in the last years of the reign forms a very interesting chapter in the decline of the medieval Church. It shows the increasingly secular outlook of the leaders of the English Church, which had more in common with that of the fifteenth-century magnate bishops than with the attitude of men like Winchelsea and his predecessors in the thirteenth century, who looked on politics from an ecclesiastical angle.
Is it therefore true, as the chroniclers said, that the bishops acted discreditably in this reign, in a spirit of political self-seeking, and that the constant crises and general unrest were largely due to their intrigues ? It seems rather that the exceptional difficulties of the time presented the bishops with problems beyond their powers to solve. The immediate urgency of these problems made it impossible for most of them to avoid being drawn into politics; and clearly a much larger proportion of the episcopate was politically active in this reign than in the years of Henry III's reign or under Edward took an important part in the formation and b different political groups and in the success actions, however, especially in Reynolds' pontificat ant as those of individual politicians rather than a united episcopate, and nearly always there w working against each other in opposite politica over, except in the early years of the struggle for the bishops did not succeed in providing the much leader to steer the country through the dangers party or group politics. After Winchelsea's death men of integrity in the episcopate who genuinely w best for the country. But Simon of Ghent, Rich John Dalderby, John Salmon, Thomas of Cobh Mortival, though most of them were distinguis all were good bishops, had not the force of cha political ability to deal with the situation, and, Reynolds, were only too often unable to make on the right course of action. At times they did particularly in mediating between the king and and in the period of ascendancy of the middle times of crisis, especially towards the end of the r passed to the more unscrupulous bishops such a Airmyn, who have therefore been regarded as t bishops of the reign. Certainly these bishops w Edward's eyes and a thorn in his side', but they number, and not, as Higden said, promoted by they mostly secured their bishoprics against were they inepti. Their importance was due rat standing ability. The tragedy of the reign w ability was so rarely combined with integrit pontificate only two bishops could lay claim to p of both these essential qualities for useful lead
Melton and Walter Stapleton, however, were both m in administrative reform and efficient governm did much to promote, than in party politics. M was generally preoccupied with northern affairs was apparently handicapped by an unexplain popularity. In any case neither of them coul political authority of an archbishop of Canterbury, chiefly because of his general slackness and ind capable of wielding.
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